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Pavlovian  stimuli  (CSs)  of  different  reward  value  induce  outcome  speciﬁc  transfer.
Knowledge  of the  predicted  outcome  appears  necessary  for the transfer  to  occur.
Emotional  response  to CSs  occurs  without  knowledge  of predicted  outcome.
Emotional  response  to CSs  is  not  sufﬁcient  to elicit  transfer.
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Reward-predictive  stimuli  augment  instrumental  reward-seeking  in  humans,  an  effect  denoted
Pavlovian-to-instrumental  transfer  (PIT),  but the  role  of  differential  reward  value  of  these  stimuli  and  of
emotional  conditioned  responses  in PIT remains  unknown.
Fifty  one  participants  experienced  a Pavlovian  phase  that  associated  two  stimuli  with either  10p  (CS10)
or  50p  (CS50).  Next,  participants  underwent  instrumental  training  for two  responses  reinforced  with
either  10p  or  50p.  Finally,  the transfer  phase  continued  as  had  instrumental  training,  now  in  the presence
of  the  Pavlovian  stimuli.
Participants  were  dichotomised  as aware/unaware  according  to their expectancy  awareness  of  the
CS  →  outcome  associations.  Only  aware  participants  demonstrated  PIT  (increased  choice  and number  ofavlovian-to-instrumental transfer
valuative-conditioning
responses  on the  10p  and  50p  response  key  in  the  presence  of  CS10  and  CS50  respectively),  yet  both
aware  and unaware  groups  rated  the  50p  stimulus  as  more  pleasant  than  the  10p  stimulus.
These  ﬁndings  suggest  that expectancy  of reward  is  necessary  for PIT;  however,  emotional  conditioned
responses  appear  not  sufﬁcient  to inﬂuence  PIT.  Future  research  should  attempt  to  manipulate  emotional
conditioned  responses  in  a PIT  context,  to test  the sufﬁciency  of  reward  expectancy  in  PIT.
© 2017  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
Multiple theories of reward-seeking converge on a causal role
f stimuli paired with positive reward-induced states in activating
ehavioural processes [1]. Such stimuli prime reward states in a
imilar manner to primary rewards themselves [2], elicit approach
ehaviour to reward-associated targets [3], and activate processes
ttributing incentive salience to reward procurement [4]. While
hese theories differ subtly in their arguments concerning the role
f such stimuli in reward-seeking, the theories each predict that
timuli increasingly activate systems representing the motivational
alue of the outcome.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: T.Duka@sussex.ac.uk (T. Duka).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2016.12.022
166-4328/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
In order to ensure that any effect of a stimulus (S) on a response
(R) is due to an outcome (O) representation, it is necessary to sep-
arate the training of S → O from R → O. Under such conditions, any
effect of a stimulus on a response must occur indirectly via an out-
come representation, as the direct S → R association has never been
explicitly reinforced [5]. Any inﬂuence of a stimulus on a response
under such separated training conditions is termed Pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer [PIT, 6].
PIT can be divided into two  forms − speciﬁc and general. Speciﬁc-
PIT is evidenced by a response bias towards the speciﬁc outcome
predicted by the stimulus [7–9]. General-PIT, in contrast, is evi-
denced by a general augmentation of responding in the presence of
an excitatory stimulus regardless of whether stimulus and response
share an outcome [10,11]. While speciﬁc-PIT is argued to rely on a
cognitive representation of outcome identity [5], general-PIT may
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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e more sensitive to a hedonic representation of outcome value
12,13].
Human PIT research supports the notion that transfer, in either
orm, only occurs in participants who expect a speciﬁc outcome
fter seeing its associated stimulus [8,14–17]. But this extant
iterature has also shown that participants who display a condi-
ioned expectancy response also display a conditioned emotional
esponse. Thus expectancy and emotion have been confounded,
aking it difﬁcult to separate their relative importance in PIT.
However, a meta-analysis by Hofmann and colleagues [18]
eported that emotional conditioned responses can be elicited
y stimuli in the absence of an expectancy response. While Hof-
ann and colleagues’ analysis demonstrated that these emotional
onditioned responses were stronger in participants possessing
uch expectancy awareness, effect sizes in “unaware” participants
ere “still reliably greater than zero” [18,p. 406]. These condi-
ioned emotional responses have been shown to track the hedonic
alue of their associated outcomes [19–21], further suggestive of
he causal predictive role of emotional conditioned responses in
eward-seeking. But the behavioural consequences of conditioned
motional responses in the absence of conditioned expectancy
esponses have not been tested under PIT conditions.
In light of these gaps in understanding, the present experiment
as devised to test how differential reward value can lead to out-
ome speciﬁc transfer as determined by the choice of the relevant
esponse (the one that will produce the predicted outcome), but
lso whether the different reward value will induce differential
egree of motivation as measured by the response rate (the num-
er of presses) on the outcome relevant key. Another important
im of the study was to examine whether emotional conditioned
esponses (ECR; ratings of pleasantness induced by the stimulus
ssociated with high reward value) also inﬂuence reward-seeking
ehaviour. To the authors’ knowledge there is no study in the lit-
rature that has directly tested the possible differential effects of
CR to Pavlovian stimuli on PIT. The hypothesis we put forward is
hat the effects of different reward value on PIT will depend on the
xplicit knowledge of stimulus outcome contingencies, whereas
he emotional responses generated by stimuli of different value
ill be independent of the contingency knowledge; the open ques-
ion remains whether the isolated hedonic value representation
licited by a stimulus is sufﬁcient for speciﬁc-transfer to occur.
hus the present experiment exploited the phenomenon whereby a
timulus paired with an emotionally salient outcome activates ECR
ithout explicit activation of expectancy conditioned responses
18]. Money was used as the outcome to ensure that behaviour
as unbiased by acute substance ingestion [22–24].
. Method
.1. Participants
54 University of Sussex students (23 males), mean age 21.7 years
range 18–37), were recruited via an online participant database
nd compensated for their time ﬁnancially or with course credit.
articipants gave written consent before beginning the study, with
thical approval being granted by the University of Sussex Life
ciences ethics committee. Inclusion criteria were that English
as their ﬁrst language, and that they were in a state of good
ealth, whereas exclusion criteria were that they were currently
aking prescription medication (excluding the contraceptive pill),
eported having been diagnosed with a mental illness, smoked
ore than ﬁve cigarettes per week, or reported a gambling problem.esearch 321 (2017) 214–222 215
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Behavioural tasks
The PIT task was  run on a PC using E-Prime v1.2 software [25].
The display background during the task was always grey. Stimuli
(see Fig. 1A) were presented at a size of 10.2 cm2 at a resolution
of 1280 × 1024 pixels. During Pavlovian training responses were
recorded using a standard QWERTY keyboard. During instrumen-
tal training and transfer the keyboard was  replaced by a ﬁve-button
response box. Buttons were aligned along the sagittal axis; only the
ﬁrst and ﬁfth buttons were active, and were coloured blue with a
black arrow pointing towards or away from the participant, respec-
tively, to indicate their activation. Throughout the experiment to
the left and right of the response equipment were two metal boxes
with their lids open. Inside the left boxes were either 64 ten pence
coins or 64 ﬁfty pence coins. The right boxes were initially empty,
but were labelled with “Your 10p box” or “Your 50p box” (see Fig. 1B
for a schematic of the apparatus layout).
2.3. Design and procedure
2.3.1. Pavlovian conditioning
The PIT task comprised three phases (see Fig. 1C for a diagram
of participants’ experience of the PIT task, including event dura-
tions). First was  a Pavlovian conditioning phase that associated
one stimulus out of the four (see Fig. 1A) with 10p (stimulus A),
and another stimulus with 50p (stimulus B), both with 100% con-
tingency with the monetary outcome. The two remaining stimuli
(stimulus X and Y) were presented horizontally adjacent to stimu-
lus A and B resulting to a 50% contingency with each outcome, and
so were non-predictive of either outcome. The inclusion of these
non-predictive stimuli was  informed by a similar method used by
Hogarth et al. [8], who demonstrated that the added complexity
afforded by the stimuli X and Y delayed the learning of the outcome
contingencies and allowed a better differentiation between aware
and unaware participants. Each trial presented either A10 or B50,
combined with either X10/50 or Y10/50, providing the trials with
the CS10 and CS50 stimuli (we keep this nomenclature throughout
the paper when we are referring to our data). The roles of the four
stimuli, and relative position (left or right), was counterbalanced,
order of presentation was random.
Participants read the following instruction screen before begin-
ning the task:
The following task is made up of trials where you can win 10
pence and 50 pence. Each trial will begin with a ﬁxation cross (+)
in the centre of the screen, which you should look at. Then two
pictures will appear. Immediately afterwards you will be asked to
rate how likely you think you are to win 10p or 50p. You will then
be prompted to press the spacebar to ﬁnd out how much you have
won. The amount you win is dependent upon which pictures were
shown on the screen. Press the spacebar to begin.
There were 128 trials in total, 64 10p trials, 64 50p trials, divided
into 8 blocks of 16. Separating CSs and outcome screens was an
expectancy question: “How likely are you to win 10p or 50p?
1 = 10p, 5 = don’t know, 9 = 50p” (although it was also explained to
participants verbally that they could use all of the number keys
1–9). After the expectancy question was a grey screen and spacebar
press before the outcome, e.g. “You win 10p”.
After each block participants were shown a screen that detailed
their total winnings for that block (always £4.80), and were
instructed to move the amount from the left-hand boxes into the
right-hand boxes. After one block the experimenter re-iterated
instructions verbally, to ensure task comprehension, before leaving
the participant to complete the remaining trials alone.
Expectancy ratings were used to classify participants in those
with the ability to discriminate between the two stimuli associated
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Fig. 1. Stimuli used in Pavlovian and transfer phases of the experiment [A], layout of apparatus within cubicle, aerial view [B] and Diagram of PIT procedure [C]; Pavlovian.
Trials began with a ﬁxation cross for duration 1s. This was  then replaced by a stimulus pair (CS; 3 s). The outcome (O) expectancy question then appeared with anchors
“1  = 10p, 5 = don’t know, 9 = 50p”. Upon response a grey screen appeared (1s; not shown), followed by an instruction to “Press the spacebar to ﬁnd out how much you have
won”  (not shown). Immediately after pressing the spacebar participants were informed of the outcome (10p/50p; 2s), which was contingent solely upon the CS displayed
(and  so not dependent on a correct response to the expectancy question). Instrumental. Trials began with a ﬁxation cross (1s). Then a pair of identical dark grey squares
(distinguishable from the lighter background) appeared (2s). This was followed by a screen prompting participants to select a response, after which came a reinforcement
screen (10p/50p; 2s). Transfer. Transfer was similar to instrumental training. However, grey squares appeared in only 1⁄3 of trials, with the remaining 2⁄3 split equally between
C  (1s). 
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ox  during instrumental training and transfer.
ith different values (50p versus 10p; named “aware”) and in those
ho were unable to discriminate between the two  stimuli associ-
ted with different values (50p versus 10p; named “unaware”). For
his purpose the 16 expectancy ratings from the ﬁnal block of Pavlo-
ian training were used. Participants were classiﬁed as ‘aware’ if
hey had signiﬁcantly lower expectancy rating for the CS predict-
ng 10p than for the CS predicting 50p (given that ‘1 = 10p, 9 = 50p’
uring the task).
.3.2. Emotional ratings emotional conditioned response; ECR
Immediately after Pavlovian conditioning, participants were
sked to rate their emotional evaluations of each stimulus. The
timuli (A, B, X, and Y, parts of the compound CS10 and CS50)
ere presented individually in random sequence with a single rat-
ng question − “How pleasant do you ﬁnd this picture?o¨r ‘How
nxious does this picture make you feel?(¨counterbalanced) − and
esponse scale below it. Participants were instructed to “Press a
umber key between 1 and 9 to indicate the strength of your feeling, = not at all, 9 = extremely’. Each stimulus remained on screen until
 response was made, at which point a blank screen appeared for a
andom duration of 2-2.5s, before the next stimulus and question
as presented.1 = LCD screen; 2 = keyboard; 3 = response box; 4 = participant; 5a/b = 10p/50p coin
ere both placed in the location of 3–keyboard during Pavlovian training, response
2.3.3. Instrumental training
Having given their emotional evaluations participants took a
ﬁve minute break before seeing written instructions detailing the
instrumental task:
In this session, by pressing the up or the down button on the
response box, you will be able to win either 10 pence or 50 pence.
Pressing one button wins 10p, pressing the other wins 50p. Some-
times you will win the money, sometimes you will win nothing.
Trials will start with a ﬁxation cross (+), which you should look at.
The cross will then be replaced by two  squares. Following this you
will be asked to press one of the buttons. You will only win  if you
press repeatedly while the prompt appears on the screen, and only
press one button within each trial. Press either button to begin.
When participants press successfully the screen appeared with
the written information “you win  10p (or 50p). If participants
did not press or pressed unsuccessfully (i.e. not repeatedly or on
both keys, only a blank screen was  presented. There were 100 tri-
als in total, divided into 5 blocks of 20. Each block ended with a
screen displaying participants’ winnings for that block (the amount
was response-contingent), and asked them to move the speciﬁed
amount into their winnings box. The experimenter re-iterated the
instructions verbally after 20 trials to ensure task comprehension,
rain Research 321 (2017) 214–222 217
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Table 1
Age and Gender for the aware and unaware participants.
Measurements Group Aware
(N = 32)
Group Unaware
(N = 19)
Statistics
Age 21.59 ± 3.87 21.42 ± 2.82 t(49) = 0.170; n.s.S. Jeffs, T. Duka / Behavioural B
efore leaving the participant to complete the task alone. Presses
n the 10p button (R10) were reinforced with a 50% contingency,
hile presses on the 50p button (R50) carried a 10% contingency.
his ensured that the utility of each button was identical and so
iscouraged a bias towards one response or the other. Association
etween button and monetary outcome was counterbalanced.
To encourage repeated pressing within each trial, reinforcement
as contingent upon a customised variable interval 2.75 s schedule
VI2.75). Participants were required to press at least twice within
 1 s window of random onset (minimum 1.5s) after the presenta-
ion of the button-press prompt. This alteration to the traditional
I setup, where a single response after a time delay is sufﬁcient to
eceive reward, ensured that participants pressed multiple times,
ather than simply pressing once towards the end of each trial.
esponses during this phase represent the baseline responding
before the CSs were presented; transfer phase).
.3.4. Transfer
The transfer phase was integrated with the instrumental train-
ng phase to appear as a continuation of the same task. However,
o balance the need to preclude new learning while maintaining
ehavioural responses, participants saw the following instruction
creen at the start of the transfer phase:
Now you will continue to earn money as before, but you will
nly be told how much at the end of the session. Sometimes the
ictures you saw earlier will be presented. Press either button to
ontinue.
Transfer proceeded similarly to instrumental training. However,
he reinforcement screen was replaced by a blank screen. Further-
ore, 1⁄3 of trials were replaced with the Pavlovian stimulus pair
S10, another 1⁄3 with the stimulus pair CS50, with the ﬁnal 1⁄3
etaining the grey squares to measure blank trials (presented along
he CSs) responding. There were 96 trials in total, split into 2 blocks
f 48. Thus each trial was presented 16 times per block. Trans-
er blocks were separated by a screen announcing “Halfway. Press
ither button to resume the task” the duration of which was par-
icipant controlled. The entire PIT procedure took approximately
0mins to complete − 30 min  for Pavlovian training, 30 min  for
he instrumental and transfer phases combined. Immediately after
he experiment, the experimenter conducted a debrieﬁng inter-
iew to gain qualitative information about participant awareness
f Pavlovian and instrumental contingencies.
Immediately following the transfer phase, the experimenter
onducted a debrieﬁng interview to gain qualitative information
bout participant awareness of Pavlovian and instrumental contin-
encies. The experimenter presented each stimulus (A, B, X, Y), in
solation, and asked the participant: “in the ﬁrst part of the experi-
ent, when you were asked to rate how likely you were to win  10p
r 50p, what did you think you’d win when you saw this picture?”
.4. Statistical analyses
3 participants were excluded following the experiment for
ailing to receive reinforcement on the R50 during instrumental
raining leaving a total of 51 participants (21 male) mean age 21.5
ears (range 18–37),
Thirty two participants were found to be “aware” whereas nine-
een participants were found to be “unaware” as classiﬁed in the
resent study.
Behaviour during instrumental training and transfer was  oper-
tionalised as the percentage of trials where participants chose to
espond, hereafter Response Choice, as well as the number of but-
on presses per second during the button-press prompt, hereafter
esponse Rate. Response Choice during instrumental training was
alculated as percentage of trials on which participant initiated aGender M = 15; F = 17 M = 6; F = 13 2(1) = 1.15; n.s.
response; calculations were separated for R10 key (50 trials in total)
and R50 key (50 trials in total) responses.
Response Choice in the transfer phase was  calculated as percent-
age of trials on which participant initiated a response; calculations
were separated for when CS10, CS50 and Blank stimulus (baseline)
was presented (32 trials per stimulus) and for responses on R10 or
R50 key (e.g.% response choice CS10/R10 and CS10/R50)
Response Rate was calculated by taking the total number of
presses, before dividing by the total response duration per trial
category (e.g. 4 s × 32 trials for CS10, CS50 and blank stimulus);
again calculations were separated for responses on R10 and R50
key (e.g. response rate CS10/R10 and CS10/R50. On either variable,
a speciﬁc-PIT effect would be demonstrated by increased respond-
ing on the button congruent versus incongruent with the displayed
CS, i.e. R50|CS50 > R50|CS10.
In order to examine the relationship between the emotional
responses to Pavlovian cues and the motivation to respond for
the cue of higher value, Pearson’s bivariate correlations were per-
formed separately for the aware and unaware group between the
differences in emotional ratings to CS50 over CS10 and the differ-
ences in Rate of responses to CS50 over CS10 (on the congruent
response keys) during transfer.
Data were analysed using SPSS 20.0. Bonferroni method was
used to control for Type I error inﬂation due to multiple com-
parisons. Greenhouse-Geisser method was used to adjust degrees
of freedom due to non-sphericity in repeated-measures analyses.
Effect sizes for ANOVAs, partial eta squared, were calculated by
SPSS.
3. Results
3.1. Expectancy awareness ratings
32 (58%) participants were classiﬁed as aware (15 males) and
19 as unaware (6 males). Aware and unaware groups did not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly in terms of age or gender (see Table 1 for group
characteristics).
Expectancy ratings showed a discrimination over time between
the trials predicting a 50p and the trials predicting a 10p win,
but only in the group of aware participants (a group x block x
awareness interaction was signiﬁcant [F (7, 343 = 11.5, p < 0.001,
2p = 0.190], explained in a further ANOVA for aware and unaware
groups separately by a CS by block interaction [F(7,217) = 34.45,
p < 0.001, 2p = 0.526] in the aware group but not in the unaware
group ([F(7,126) = 1.21, p = 0.303, 2p = 0.063; see Fig. 2). The post-
hoc awareness questionnaire when the stimuli in each CS were
presented in isolation showed that from the classiﬁed as aware
participants (n = 32) at the end of the Pavlovian training, 30 partic-
ipants were able to respond correctly about the predicted outcome
when CS10 and CS50 were presented; one participant was able
to respond correctly to CS10 and one participant to CS50 only.
From the classiﬁed as unaware (n = 19), three participants were
able to respond correctly to CS10 and four participant to CS50 only;
twelve participants responded “I don’t know” to both stimuli. Thus
post-hoc awareness identiﬁed 30 participants as fully aware, 12
participants as fully unaware and 9 participants as semi-aware.
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Fig. 4. Mean Response Choice (R10 or R50) for aware [a] and unaware [b] groups
during instrumental training (baseline) and during transfer when the conditionedig. 2. Mean expectancy of outcome during Pavlovian training for CS10 and CS50
rials across blocks of trials for aware and unaware participants.
.1.1. Emotional ratings (emotional conditioned response; ECR)
In contrast to expectancy ratings there was no dissociation
etween the aware versus unaware group’s emotional ratings of
ach stimulus. For pleasantness ratings a mixed ANOVA was  per-
ormed using stimulus A, stimulus B and stimulus X, Y combined
s a within factor and awareness as a between factor. Aware-
ess as factors conﬁrmed a main effect of Stimulus [F(2,49) = 27.40,
 < 0.001, 2p = 0.359], with stimulus predicting 50p having higher
leasantness ratings than stimulus predicting 10p. Pleasantness
atings for stimuli X and Y combined were lower than the ratings of
he stimulus predicting 50p and higher for the stimulus predicting
0p; see Fig. 3).
.2. Instrumental training
All participants, asked at the end of the experiment, correctly
dentiﬁed the causal relationship between each button and its mon-
tary value. All participants’ response behaviour was comparable
n each button by the end of training (i.e. there was no bias to either
utton). A mixed ANOVA on Response Choice (% of responses on R10
s R50) and Response Rate (responses per second on R10 vs R50) for
ware and unaware participants (entering awareness as a factor),
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ig. 3. Mean pleasantness rating for stimulus A, B and X and Y combined (X/Y)
ollowing Pavlovian training for aware and unaware participants. ** P < 0.01 com-
ared to ratings for stimulus B and X/Y. * p < 0.05 compared to X/Y in aware only
articipants; # p = 0.073 compared to X/Y in unaware participants.
stimuli were introduced for the blank, the CS10 and the CS50 trials. Trials of R10
response choice in the presence of CS10 and of R50 response choice in the presence
of  CS50 represent congruent trials; trials of R10 response choice in the presence
of  CS50 and of R50 response choice in the presence of CS10 represent incongruent
trials; **; p < 0.001 compared to incongruent trial and to baseline and blank for both
R50  and R10 response choices. #: p < 0.001 compared to baseline and blank for both
R50 and R10 response choices. No signiﬁcant differences were found for the unaware
group (ps > 0.178). Congruent responses during CS10 and CS50 presentation were
signiﬁcantly different between aware and unaware (p < 0.001).
found only that aware participants chose more often to respond
overall than unaware participants [a main effect of Awareness was
found for Response choice, [(F(1,49) = 9.98, p < 0.01 2p = 0.169]; no
signiﬁcant effects were found for response rates. Mean Response
Choice and Response Rate (for R10 and R50 key) during instrumen-
tal training are given as baseline (before transfer phase started) for
aware and unaware participants in Figs. 4 and 5 respectively. Miss-
ing trials (trials during which participants decided not to press)
varied between 1% and 16% with a mean of 4.5% (n = 39); all remain-
ing participants chose to press in every trial.
3.3. TransferNine participants did not chose to press at least in one of the
trials; four participants did not press in trials when the blank was
presented, seven when the CS10 was  presented and three when
the CS50 was  presented. All remaining participants (n = 42) chose
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line and blank trials for both on R50 and R10 number of responses (response rate).
#  p < 0.001 compared to baseline and blank for both on R50 and R10 number ofS. Jeffs, T. Duka / Behavioural B
o press on every trial. Trials during which participants decided not
o press varied between 3% and 34% with a mean of 9.5.
For response choice an Awareness x CS x Response key inter-
ction [(F (2,98) = 37.67, p < 0.001, 2p = 0.435],was explained in
eparate repeated measures ANOVAs for each awareness group, by
 CS x response key interaction in aware [F(2,62) = 114.1, p < 0.001,
2
p = 0.786] but not in unaware participants [(F(2,36) = 1.11,
 = 0.340 2p = 0.058; see Fig. 4a and b]. Post-hoc comparisons are
iven in the ﬁgures and ﬁgure legends 4a and 4b.
A similar pattern was observed for Response Rate. The mixed
NOVA found Awareness x CS x Response key interaction [F
2,98) = 33.53, p < 0.001, 2p = 0.400]. The Awareness x CS x Response
ey interaction was investigated with separate repeated measures
NOVAs for each awareness group, with CS and Response key as
actors. A signiﬁcant CS x Response key interaction was found
or the aware [F(2,62) = 95.0, p < 0.001, 2p = 0.755] but not for the
naware group [F(2,62) = 0.654, p =0.526, 2p = 0.035; see Fig. 5a and
]. Post-hoc comparisons are given in the ﬁgures and ﬁgure legends
a and 5b
We also performed a mixed ANOVA for Response choice and
esponse rate, entering as an additional ﬁxed factor Emotional
onditioned Response (ECR) group “high” versus “low” based on
 median split of the differences in pleasantness ratings for CS50
ver CS10. From the 32 aware participants 15 were in the group
CR “high” and 17 in “low”. From the 19 unaware participants, 10
ere in the group ECR “high” and 9 in “low”.
The Awareness x CS x Response key interaction remained
igniﬁcant for both Response choice ([F (2.94) = 39.43, p < 0.001,
2
p = 0.456]) and Response rate ([F (2,94) = 35.42, p < 0.001,
2
p = 0.452]). No other relevant signiﬁcant interactions involving
CR group were revealed. Table 2 presents Response choice and
esponse rates for the aware and unaware participants separately
or participants with high and low ECR.
We  repeated the ANOVA for Response choice and Response rate,
ntering as ﬁxed factor ECR group “high” versus “low” but with
ost-hoc awareness as a ﬁxed factor. For this analysis we  divided
ur participants in aware (n = 30; the ones who responded correctly
or CS10 and CS50) and unaware (n = 12; the ones who responded
ith “I don’t know”) based on post-hoc awareness ratings. The
wareness x CS x Response key interaction remained signiﬁcant
or both Response choice ([F (2,76) = 30.93, p < 0.001, 2p = 0.449])
nd Response rate ([F (2,76) = 25.54, p < 0.001, 2p = 0.402]; data not
hown). No other relevant signiﬁcant interactions involving ECR
roup were revealed.
Correlations between pleasantness difference ratings for the
timulus CS50 over CS10 and Response rate differences for the
S50 over CS10 on their respective Response keys (congruent
esponses) were not signiﬁcant either in aware (r=0.151, p=0.408)
r in unaware (r=0.381; p=0.107) participants.
. Discussion
The aims of the current experiment were twofold. One aim was
o demonstrate that differential value of the outcome (50p versus
0p) would lead to an outcome speciﬁc transfer. Indeed partici-
ants increased their choices and rate of response for the respective
esponse keys in the presence of CS50 and CS10. However this effect
as seen only in participants aware of the CS-outcome contin-
encies based on outcome expectancy ratings. Another aim was to
est whether a positive subjective emotional response elicited by
 reward-paired cue could inﬂuence a separately trained reward-
eeking response, independent of knowledge of the cue–reward
ssociation. The second hypothesis was not supported − a group
f participants who displayed differential emotional responses to
timuli predictive of either 10p or 50p, despite an absence of explicitresponses (response rate). No signiﬁcant differences were found for the unaware
group (ps > 0.138). Congruent responses during CS10 and CS50 presentation were
signiﬁcantly different between aware and unaware (p < 0.001).
knowledge of these predictive relationships (the ‘unaware’ group),
did not display differential behavioural responses when encoun-
tering the stimuli in an instrumental context. As mentioned above
only participants who were aware of the CS–outcome associations
displayed an inﬂuence of the CS on behaviour.
The present behavioural results are in accord with previous
studies that have supported the role of expectancy awareness in
mediating speciﬁc-PIT [8,17,26]. The current study strengthens
this existing literature by ﬁnding that the emotional condi-
tioned responses that accompany expectancy awareness do not
by themselves elicit speciﬁc-transfer. Thus knowledge of reward
availability is a necessary criterion in the control of reward-seeking
choice by separately trained stimuli. Indeed, the magnitude of
emotional conditioned response was indistinguishable in aware
and unaware cohorts, thus any differences in behaviour cannot
be attributed to differences in emotional reactivity. Moreover, the
lack of speciﬁc-transfer in the unaware group was not due to ceil-
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Table 2
Response choice and Response rate for each stimulus presented and each response key in transfer. Data (mean (SEM)) are presented separately for aware participants with
low  or high ECR and for unaware participants with low or high ECR.
Aware (n = 32) Unaware (n = 19)
Low
ECR (n = 17)
High
ECR (n = 15)
Low
ECR (n = 9)
High
ECR (n = 10)
Response Choice (%)
Blank/R10 54.96 (8.2) 42. 71 (7.4) 76.74 (6.03) 31.56 (8.4)
Blank/R50 45.04 (8.2) 57.08 (7.5) 21.18 (5.7) 67.50 (8.1)
CS10/R10 92.36 (2.5) 93.33 (3.3) 50.69 (10.0) 38.13 (6.7)
CS10/R50 8.09 (2.6) 6.67 (3.3) 46.87 (10.7) 59.38 (6.0)
CS50/R10 9.37 (4.7) 4.7 (3.3) 47.57 (11.4) 35.00 (7.5)
CS50/R50 90.63 (4.6) 92.77 (2.9) 48.26 (12.0) 64.06 (7.2)
Response Rate (Hz)
Blank/R10 1.94 (0.3) 1.82 (0.4) 2.42 (0.3) 1.42 (0.4)
Blank/R50 1.69 (0.3) 2.29 (0.3) 0.59 (0.2) 2.82 (0.4)
CS10/R10 3.30 (0.2) 3.93 (0.3) 1.53 (0.4) 1.53 (0.2)
CS10/R50 0.29 (0.1) 0.24 (0.1) 1.44 (0.4) 2.41 (0.3)
CS50/R10 0.35 (0.2) 0.17 (0.1) 1.55 (0.4) 1.57 (0.3)
.00 (0
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mCS50/R50 3.27 (0.2) 4
ng effects constraining their behaviour − their overall Response
hoice, i.e. response initiation, was subtly lower than the aware
roup, and Response Rate was no different. Instead, the distinc-
ion between awareness groups lay in their allocation of pressing
o each button in the presence of each stimulus.
While the current data is supportive of the role of expectancy in
peciﬁc-PIT, it is less able to explicate the role of emotion in general-
IT. The speciﬁc version is argued to rely on the stimulus activating
he speciﬁc sensory identity of the outcome, which in turn biases
hoice of response towards that which procures the same out-
ome [5,6,27]. The general version is suggested to occur through
he stimulus activating the general emotional features of the out-
ome, which in turn augments any concurrent response, regardless
f whether stimulus and response share an outcome [12,13]. The
urrent experiment found no general augmentation of responding
n the presence of the higher-reward CS50 compared to the lower-
eward CS10, despite running additional analyses which included
high’ versus ‘low’ Emotional Conditioned Response as a factor.
However, this lack of general-PIT may  be an artefact of the
esign employed. The present task used a speciﬁc-PIT paradigm
hich could not assess response augmentation (general-PIT) inde-
endently from response choice (speciﬁc-PIT), given that each CS
erved both as an emotional and a predictive stimulus. This may
ave biased participants towards using a more cognitive response
election strategy, which usurped any emotional response augmen-
ation.
Nevertheless, the use of unaware participants in the current
xperiment may  provide a valuable means to study general PIT if
ombined with an amended paradigm. For example, results from
n alternative method provide a relatively consistent demonstra-
ion of general transfer in humans, and so may  be more suited to the
tudy of general-PIT [15,16,28,29]; but see [30]]. The above authors
sed a modiﬁed PIT paradigm, whereby two stimuli (S1 & S2) pre-
icted speciﬁc outcomes (O1 & O2) shared with two  instrumental
esponses (R1 & R2), whereas a third stimulus (S3) was paired with
n outcome (O3) that had no corresponding response, arguing that
his precluded any speciﬁc-transfer effect in the presence of S3 [10].
espite the apparent prevention of speciﬁc transfer, these studies
till demonstrated an augmentation of general responding in the
resence of the S3, and congruent biasing of response selection in
he presence of S1 & S2. Moreover, rodent lesion studies have shown
ouble dissociations of the brain regions necessary for general- and
peciﬁc-PIT using this S3 method [10,31], suggesting that the design
ay  help delineate motivational structures in humans..3) 1.72 (0.6) 2.53 (0.2)
However, the S3 method has shown less consistent results
in human brain imaging, with studies either not demonstrating
general-PIT behaviourally [e.g. [30]], or not ﬁnding such clean dis-
sociations neurally [32]. Similar to the present experiment, the
lack of clear general-PIT may have been due to participants adopt-
ing a cognitive response strategy that usurped general response
augmentation. Such cognitive strategies may  be precluded by the
selection of unaware participants, who  have been shown by the
present experiment to be unable to demonstrate speciﬁc-PIT, and
so just as the S3 is argued to prevent speciﬁc-PIT, so too may the
inclusion of unaware participants be used as an additional method
to prevent speciﬁc-PIT.
Additionally, Nadler et al. [15] suggest that the heightened abso-
lute value of ECR was  key to their demonstration of S3 general-PIT.
It is possible that the level of appetitive ECR in the present study
was insufﬁcient to arouse general-PIT, in comparison to the aver-
sive ECR used by Nadler et al. However, Nadler et al. did not report
measures of ECR. Thus, the present experiment provides a further
procedure that can be integrated into future PIT studies with aware
and unaware participants, in the form of simple evaluative ratings
of Pavlovian stimuli, that may  be able to further elucidate the role
of ECR in general-PIT.
Whether behavioural sensitivity to ECR may be ampliﬁed by
lacking conscious awareness of the conditioned stimulus is an
important possibility that warrants exploration; if reward-seeking
can be controlled by stimuli outside of conscious awareness, then
behaviour may  be less amenable to conscious control strategies. In
a test of unconscious stimulus control, Pessiglione and colleagues
used subliminal stimulus presentation to induce unawareness
of the available outcome, and used discriminative instrumental
paradigms where the stimulus signalled the utility of a response
in gaining the outcome [33,34]. Similar to the present results, Pes-
siglione and colleagues showed an emotional conditioned response
to the reward-paired stimulus. But in contrast to the present data,
they also showed greater instrumental responding to the reward-
paired stimulus in their unaware participants. One explanation
for the discrepancy between the behavioural results of Pessiglione
et al. and those of the current study may  be the use of concurrent
versus separate S → O and R → O training. Whereas Pessiglione and
colleagues’ design allowed a direct S → R association to form, the
current experiment’s PIT design precluded such a direct association.
Thus emotional conditioned responses in unaware individuals may
inﬂuence behaviour if the stimulus has gained direct access to the
response.
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Although the development of emotional conditioned responses
n the absence of expectancy awareness was  not the focus of
he present investigation, the data provide further support that
motional appreciation of a stimulus can occur in the absence of
nowledge of its associated outcome [18]. While it is difﬁcult to
onﬁrm the absence of awareness, Lovibond & Shanks [35] provide
riteria for a robust study of awareness that the current proce-
ure adhere to. Stimuli were abstract shapes that participants had
ot experienced before, therefore excluding external sources of
motion; a range of stimuli were used and their relationship to
ither outcome was counterbalanced, therefore precluding the con-
ound that any one stimulus was intrinsically more emotional;
xpectancy awareness was tested during learning rather than dur-
ng debrieﬁng, thus reducing memory demands on the display of
wareness.
Where the current design could be improved may  be in the
nclusion of an awareness measurement that more closely matches
he evaluative conditioning measurement. Whereas expectancy
as primarily assessed while associative learning was  taking place
nd in the presence of the two stimuli (CSs, one predictive, the other
on-predictive), emotion was assessed at the end of the condition-
ng and ratings were taken in the presence of a single stimulus
the predictive and non-predictive stimuli were presented sepa-
ately). Difference in test conditions could be argued to reduce
he sensitivity of the awareness measure, relative to the emo-
ion measure [see 36], and so misclassify aware participants as
naware. However, given the post-transfer awareness data, which
sed individual stimulus presentation to classify participants, any
isclassiﬁcation was minimal. Only 2 participants originally clas-
iﬁed as ‘aware’ failed to identify both CS → O relationships, and
o originally ‘unaware’ participants were able to correctly clas-
ify both CS → O relationships post-transfer. Although 7 unaware
articipants were able to identify one of the CS → O relationships
ost-transfer, whether or not these 7 ‘unaware’, and 2 ‘aware’, par-
icipants were included in the analyses did not alter the pattern of
esults − only the aware group displayed speciﬁc-PIT. Thus, even
f these 7 ‘unaware’ participants had gained some form of aware-
ess prior to the transfer phase, their level of awareness was not
ufﬁcient to induce transfer.
Finally, although the current experiment ﬁnds that expectancy
wareness is necessary for the control of behaviour by sepa-
ately trained reward-paired cues, it does not attest to whether
xpectancy awareness is sufﬁcient. It may  be that knowledge of
he outcome coupled with an emotional conditioned response is
equired, alternatively a cognitive representation alone may  be all
hat is needed to inﬂuence reward-seeking.
The role of cognitive outcome representations [7,11,37] has
een proposed, in that speciﬁc-PIT in both humans and rodents
as been shown to be insensitive to outcome devaluation. Changes
n outcome value have been shown to change the conditioned
motional response elicited by the outcome’s predictive stimu-
us [19–21]. But whether these changes in emotional conditioned
esponse persist into speciﬁc-PIT contexts has yet to be conﬁrmed.
uture research should therefore measure emotional conditioned
esponses during transfer to assess whether speciﬁc-PIT is insensi-
ive to both outcome value and conditioned emotional response.
To conclude, the present investigation tested the role of condi-
ioned emotional response in PIT. Results showed that emotional
esponse was not sufﬁcient to elicit transfer, and instead that
eward expectancy was necessary. While necessary in the current
xperiment, the sufﬁciency of reward expectancy in PIT has yet to
e conﬁrmed. Thus future research should manipulate conditioned
motional response during transfer, to test the behavioural effects
f dissociated reward expectancy.
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